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The impact of threat of shock on the
framing effect and temporal
discounting: executive functions
unperturbed by acute stress?
Oliver J. Robinson*, Rebecca L. Bond and Jonathan P. Roiser
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, UK
Anxiety and stress-related disorders constitute a large global health burden, but are
still poorly understood. Prior work has demonstrated clear impacts of stress upon
basic cognitive function: biasing attention toward unexpected and potentially threatening
information and instantiating a negative affective bias. However, the impact that these
changes have on higher-order, executive, decision-making processes is unclear. In this
study, we examined the impact of a translational within-subjects stress induction (threat
of unpredictable shock) on two well-established executive decision-making biases:
the framing effect (N = 83), and temporal discounting (N = 36). In both studies, we
demonstrate (a) clear subjective effects of stress, and (b) clear executive decision-
making biases but (c) no impact of stress on these decision-making biases. Indeed,
Bayes factor analyses confirmed substantial preference for decision-making models
that did not include stress. We posit that while stress may induce subjective mood
change and alter low-level perceptual and action processes (Robinson et al., 2013c),
some higher-level executive processes remain unperturbed by these impacts. As such,
although stress can induce a transient affective biases and altered mood, these need
not result in poor financial decision-making.
Keywords: threat of shock, stress, temporal discounting, framing effect, anxiety, depression, executive function,
Bayesian models
Introduction
Stress can signiﬁcantly alter the way that we perceive and react to the world, promoting the
processing of threatening and unexpected information (Robinson et al., 2013b,c). This threat bias
can be adaptive – improving the ability to detect and avoid further sources of stress – but this
bias also likely contributes, at least in part, to the facilitatory role that stress plays in the onset
of mood and anxiety disorders (Kendler et al., 2004). Threat of unpredictable shock is a reliable
within-subject method of inducing stress in both humans and experimental animals (Grillon, 2008;
Davis et al., 2010). While the impact of threat of shock on basic perceptual processes is relatively
well studied, its impact on higher-level executive processes such as decision-making is surprisingly
poorly understood (Robinson et al., 2013c). Here, we explore the impact of threat of shock on two
classic decision-making biases: the framing eﬀect and temporal discounting.
Threat of shock is a translational stress-induction procedure in which an individual anticipates
an unpredictable and unpleasant electrical shock (Schmitz and Grillon, 2012). In animals threat
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of shock has been shown to engage neural circuitry distinct
from that engaged during fear conditioning (Davis et al.,
2010), another widely used but conceptually diﬀerent aversive
processing paradigm. More precisely, anxiety (or stress) is
operationally deﬁned as the prolonged apprehensive response to
a context in which threats may occur, whereas fear is the acute
response to a discrete, deﬁned and predictable aversive stimulus
or cue (Davis et al., 2010; Robinson et al., 2013c). Critically, stress
induced by threat of shock has well documented psychological
(Robinson et al., 2013c), psychophysiological (Grillon et al.,
1991), and neural eﬀects (Cornwell et al., 2007; Robinson et al.,
2012, 2013b). Perhaps more importantly there is also emerging
evidence that threat of shock evokes mechanisms related to those
that participate in pathological anxiety, for example Generalized
Anxiety Disorder (Robinson et al., 2013c, 2014). As such, it is
hoped that exploring the impact of threat of shock on cognitive
functions may also provide a window into the mechanisms which
contribute to pathological stress-related disorders in healthy
individuals, prior to disorder onset (Robinson et al., 2014).
Executive function is an umbrella term encompassing
cognitive functions that do more than passively process
information. Such non-automatic functions might integrate
information from multiple sensory domains along with
information stored in memory. Executive function therefore
encompasses higher order processes, such as planning and
decision-making. The impact of threat of shock on executive
function has not been comprehensively studied. Here we explore
one aspect of executive function: ﬁnancial decision-making.
We are aware of only two studies in which threat of shock was
shown to alter ﬁnancial choices. In the ﬁrst, threat of shock
promoted risk-avoidant decision-making (Clark et al., 2012).
However, in this study, the threat cues were discrete, of short
duration (5–5.5 s) and possibly more comparable to a fear cue
than an anxiety/stress condition. In the second study (Robinson
et al., 2015), threat of shock had no main eﬀect on gambling
choices, but did interact with trait anxiety, promoting ‘harm-
avoidant’ (i.e., playing less ‘disadvantageous’ decks) under stress
in those with the low anxiety symptoms. However, the Iowa
gambling task used in this second study confounds a number
of decision-making and basic cognitive processes, making the
causes of this result unclear. In the small number of remaining
studies that have addressed this question, the eﬀects seemed to
be largely restricted to reaction times (Murphy, 1959; Keinan,
1987; Engelmann et al., 2015), with stress having no impact on
the decisions themselves.
Microeconomic theory has outlined a number of biases – or
heuristics – which have been shown to guide individual ﬁnancial
decision-making behavior. In this study, we explore two well-
established biases: the framing eﬀect and temporal discounting.
The framing eﬀect describes the reliable propensity of individuals
to alter their decisions, dependent on whether the same choice
is ‘framed’ as a loss or a gain. Speciﬁcally, individuals tend to
avoid risk when a choice is framed as a gain (e.g., keep £2 out
of £10 vs. a 20% chance to win £10), and become risk-seeking
when the exact same choice is framed as a loss (e.g., lose £8 out of
£10 vs. a 20% chance to win £10). That is to say, all other things
being equal, individuals are biased against certain outcomes
‘framed’ as losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; De Martino
et al., 2006). Temporal discounting is another such bias, in which
an individual assigns less value to gains in the future relative to
the present (Rachlin and Green, 1972; Berns et al., 2007). For
instance, oﬀered £10 today and £11 in a month, there is a bias
toward accepting the lower value of £10 now. In other words,
temporal distance causes devaluation of potential gains. In both
paradigms, the subjective utility of ﬁnancially identical options
is biased by the context in which the options are presented.
Given that both of these biases can be ﬁnancially suboptimal and
result in reduced gains/increased losses, it is plausible that they
might be shifted by contexts such as stress-induced biases toward
negative stimuli (Robinson et al., 2013c). Clinical support for
this hypothesis comes from the observation of altered decision-
making and negative biases in disorders associated with anxiety
and negative aﬀect such as major depression (Eshel and Roiser,
2010; and it should be noted that stress, negative mood, and
anxiety are relatively diﬀuse, likely overlapping, concepts).
Therefore, we explored the impact of stress on the framing
eﬀect and temporal discounting. We predicted that threat of
shock would induce a state of adaptive anxiety (Robinson et al.,
2013c) and promote harm-avoidant decisions (Clark et al., 2012;
Robinson et al., 2013c), thereby increasing both framing and
temporal discounting. Speciﬁcally, in the context of uncertain
threat an individual might be more loss averse, resulting in an
increased framing eﬀect (Porcelli and Delgado, 2009). At the
same time in the context of an uncertain future, an individual
might be biased toward immediate vs. future gains resulting
in increased temporal discounting (Pulcu et al., 2014). This
study explored these hypotheses with conventional signiﬁcance
testing as well as a Bayesian approach to enable a more nuanced
comparison of diﬀerent behavioral models.
Materials and Methods
Sample and Screening
Participants were recruited from the UCL Institute of Cognitive
Neuroscience Subject Database, of which N = 83 (49 female:
34 male; mean age = 24, SD = 5) completed the framed
gamble task and N = 36 (18 female: 18 male; mean age = 24,
SD = 6) completed the temporal discounting task (N = 35
completed both). All participants completed a prior phone screen
in which they reported no personal history of/treatment for
psychiatric or neurological disorders or drug use (from a detailed
speciﬁc checklist of all disorders), along with no cardiovascular
problems, pacemakers, or cochlear implants. The demographics
represented the naturalistic sample of individuals who responded
to our call for participants and who passed screening. All
subjects provided written informed consent (UCL Research
Ethics Committee Project ID Number: 1764/001). Both decision
tasks were presented on a desktop computer using the Cogent
toolbox for Matlab (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging
and Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, UCL, London, UK). To
incentivise performance subjects were informed that additional
compensation would be provided based upon task performance.
Shocks were delivered to the non-dominant wrist using a DS7
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stimulator (Digitimer Ltd, Welwyn Garden City, UK). Prior to
testing, all subjects completed a shock work-up procedure in
which shocks were titrated (over approximately 3–5 stimulations)
to a level that was ‘unpleasant but not painful’(Schmitz and
Grillon, 2012).
Anxiety Measures
At the end of each block, participants indicated how anxious
they had felt during each of the threat and safe conditions
on a scale from 1 (“not at all”) to 10 (“very much so”) as a
subjective manipulation check. Participants also provided self-
report measures of depression (Beck Depression Inventory: BDI;
Beck and Steer, 1987) and trait anxiety (State Trait Anxiety
Inventory: STAI; Spielberger et al., 1970) at the end of the session.
Framed Gamble Task
This task was adapted from that used by DeMartino et al. (2006).
The task consisted of eight blocks (four safe, four threat), each
comprising 14 trials. “YOU ARE NOW SAFE FROM SHOCK”
or “YOU ARE NOW AT RISK OF SHOCK” was presented for
3 s at the beginning of each new block. Threat blocks had a red
background, whilst safe blocks had a blue background. A single
shock was delivered at a pseudorandom time in each threat
block. Each trial began with a message “You receive £X” where,
X = varying monetary amounts. Participants then had 4 s to
choose between a certain option, which would leave them with
a guaranteed portion of the total £X, or an option to gamble,
which could lead to either winning the entire amount or winning
nothing. The participant did not discover the outcome of any
gambles, but was instructed to consider which option they would
choose to maximize wins and minimize losses. In gain frames
the participant would have the ‘sure’ option to “Keep £Y,” a
certain portion of the total whereas in loss frames participants
were told they would “Lose £Z” (where Z + Y = X), implying
that they would retain the rest of the total (i.e., £Y) – note
that this represents precisely the same decision. Alternatively,
participants could choose a gamble option which was presented
with a pie chart indicating the probability of each keeping or
losing the entire £X amount. In experimental trials, the expected
values (sum of all possible outcomes weighted by their respective
probabilities) of the gamble and sure options were matched
(Figure 1A). Expected outcomes were 20, 40, 60, or 80% of the
initial total £X, which was set as £25, £50, £75, or £100. Monetary
parameters were counterbalanced across decision frames and
between threat and safe blocks. ‘Catch’ trials were also included to
verify that the participants were attending to and had understood
the task. These trials were designed such that the expected
outcome of one option was much larger than that of the other
option, such that participants should always choose the option of
higher value.
Each block consisted of 10 standard trials (ﬁve in each frame)
and with four catch trials (one in each combination of frame and
preferred option) in a random order, with the certain and gamble
options randomized to the left or right of the screen. Choices
were indicated by pressing the left or right arrow key. The chosen
option was highlighted by a star for 1 s. Analysis was conducted
on the proportion of trials on which participants chose to gamble,
and reaction times to choose each of the gamble and the certain
options. Before the main task, six practice trials (one of each type
of catch trial, plus a standard trial in each the gains and losses
frames) were completed without a time limit or threat of shock
to ensure participants understood the task. Task duration was
approximately 15 min.
Temporal Discounting Task
On each trial subjects were presented with a (self-paced) choice
between an immediate reward (e.g., “£5.00 now”) and a delayed
reward (e.g., “£10.00 in 25 years”). The value of the delayed
reward was ﬁxed whilst the immediate reward was adjusted
based upon previous choices until an indiﬀerence point was
reached. Adjustment was based on Yi et al. (2010) abbreviation of
Johnson and Bickel’s (2002) algorithm. Indiﬀerence points were
recorded for three delayed values (£10, £100, and £1000), three
delays (1 day, 1 year, and 25 years) and for both gain and loss
frames (“Which would you prefer to receive?” or “Which would
you prefer to lose?”), yielding a total of 18 indiﬀerence points
(Figure 1B). The task consisted of six blocks (three safe, three
threat), during each of which six (randomly selected without
replacement) indiﬀerence points were reached. As the algorithm
adjusted the choices presented based upon previous responses,
the number of trials per block varied (range ∼60–80). The screen
displayed “YOU ARE NOW SAFE FROM SHOCK” with a blue
background at the start of safe blocks or “YOU ARE NOW AT
RISK OF SHOCK” with a red background at the start of threat
blocks. Shocks (N = 4) were presented in a pseudo-random
order during threat blocks. Task duration was approximately
15 min.
Analysis
Conventional frequentist signiﬁcance tests were run in SPSS
version 22 (IBM Corp, Armonk, NY) whilst Bayesian analyses
were run in JASP, employing the default prior (Rouder et al.,
2012; Love et al., 2015; Morey and Rouder, 2015). Frequentist
and Bayesian repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA)
models were constructed in exactly the same manner for all
analyses (see below), with frequentist ANOVAs used to generate
F-statistics, p-values and eﬀect sizes for interactions of interest,
and Bayesian ANOVAs used to generate log Bayes factors
(logBF10)1 for models of interest relative to a null model (main
eﬀect of subject).
In our Bayesian analyses, the ‘winning’ model was deﬁned
as the model with the highest BF10 relative to the null, and
the relative predictive success of one model over another was
computed by dividing the BF10 for one model by the other.
Any value greater than zero indicates a model better than the
comparison. Semantic labels were assigned to the magnitude of
these comparisons to aid interpretation, ranging from anecdotal
(1–3), to substantial (3–10), to strong (10–30) to decisive (>100;
Jeﬀreys, 1998). Where reported for interactions, the Bayes factors
1Note that the ‘BF10’ nomenclature in JASP refers to the Bayes factor for H1 vs. H0
(model relative to null); as distinct from ‘BF01,’ which is the Bayes factor for H0 vs.
H1 (null relative to model). It does not refer to log10. Where we refer to ‘logBF10,’
we report the natural log of the BF10 values. This log is not required; it is simply
used to make the frequently very large numbers more interpretable.
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FIGURE 1 | Task sequences. (A) The Framed gamble task (n.b asterisk represents subject choice, not outcome) and (B) temporal discounting task Subjects
completed both tasks under threat (red background) and safe (blue background) conditions, with a total of four shocks per task occurring at a pseudorandom point
within threat blocks only.
represent a model including the interaction plus the main eﬀect
of each component of the interaction.
Statistical Models
Manipulation eﬃcacy was assessed using a paired t-test (and
Bayesian equivalent) to compare retrospective ratings across
stress conditions.
For the framed gamble task, the proportion of trials on
which participants chose the gamble option was assessed using
a repeated-measures ANOVA with stress condition (threat/safe)
and decision frame (gains/losses domains) as within-subject
factors. Reaction time was analyzed in a similar model, with the
addition of choice (gamble/sure) as an additional within-subjects
factor.
For the temporal discounting task, we analyzed normalized
indiﬀerence points (indiﬀerence point/ﬁxed delayed value) in a
repeated-measures ANOVA with stress condition (threat/safe),
decision valence (gain/lose), delayed value (£10/£100/£1000)
and time (1 day, 1 year, 25 years) as within-subjects factors.
Reaction times for choices across each indiﬀerence point (mean
reaction time of all responses required to reach indiﬀerence) were
analyzed in a separate model with the same factors.
Finally, for both tasks, additional exploratory between-
subjects analyses were also run including measures of mood
symptoms and order of threat-safe counterbalancing as
covariates. These were separate models, run after the a priori
within-subject models. BDI symptom data was not normally
distributed, and was square-root transformed prior to analysis.
Further exploratory analyses suggested during peer review were
also run: gender, age, and threat potentiated (threat minus safe)
subjective ratings were included as additional between subject
factors.
Results
Data for these tasks are freely available for download2.
Manipulation Check
Subjects reported feeling signiﬁcantly more anxious in the stress
relative to the safe condition in both the framed gamble [a mean
rating (±SD) of 6 ± 2/10 relative to 2 ± 1/10; t(82) = –16,
p < 0.001] and temporal discounting tasks [6 ± 2/10 relative to
2 ± 1/10; t(34) = –10, p < 0.001]. Bayes factors indicated that
models including stress conditions were decisively better than
the null model for both the framed gamble (logBF10 = 57) and




A signiﬁcant framing eﬀect was demonstrated. Speciﬁcally,
participants gambled more in the losses frame (probability of
gambling = 0.54 ± 0.2) than in the gains frame [probability
of gambling = 0.37 ± 0.2; main eﬀect of frame: F(1,82) = 83,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.5]. However, this did not interact with threat
2http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.ﬁgshare.1423293
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of shock [stress × frame interaction: F(1,82) = 0.13, p = 0.72,
η2p = 0.002; Figure 2A] and there was no main eﬀect of stress
[F(1,82) = 3.7, p = 0.06, η2p = 0.043]. Bayes factor analysis
revealed the winning model to be one including only a main
eﬀect of frame (logBF10 = 46), which was substantially (7.6 times)
better than a model additionally including the stress × frame
interaction (logBF10 = 44).
Reaction times
Subjects (only N = 74 had RTs in all cells, since some subjects
never chose at least one of the options) were signiﬁcantly faster
to choose in the loss than gain frame [main eﬀect of frame:
F(1,74) = 7.5, p = 0.008, η2p = 0.091] and under threat of shock
[main eﬀect of stress: F(1,74)= 5.0, p= 0.029, η2p = 0.063]. These
eﬀects were qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant stress × frame interaction
[F(1,74) = 7.0, p = 0.01, η2p = 0.086]. Analyses of the simple
main eﬀects revealed that stress induced quicker responses in
the gains domain [F(1,74) = 12, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.14] but not
in the losses domain [F(1,74) = 0.11, p = 0.74, η2p < 0.002;
Figure 2B]. Bayes factor analysis revealed that the winning
model comprised individual main eﬀects of stress and frame
(logBF10 = 2.1), without the interaction; but this was only
anecdotally (1.1 times, Jeﬀreys, 1998) better than the model also
including a stress × frame interaction (logBF10 = 2.0).
FIGURE 2 | (A) The framing effect did not differ between stress conditions in
terms of the proportion of gambles accepted, but (B) stress did speed up




Neither safe-threat order [frame × order interaction:
F(1,81) = 0.20, p = 0.66, η2p = 0.002] nor baseline symptoms
[frame × STAI interaction : F(1,81) = 1.4, p = 0.24, η2p = 0.017;
frame × BDI interaction: F(1,80) = 0.28, p = 0.60, η2p = 0.003]
interacted with any of the main eﬀects of interest. There was no
exploratory stress × frame × gender interaction [F(1,81) = 0.07,
p = 0.8, η2p = 0.001], stress × frame × age interaction
[F(1,81) = 0.62, p = 0.53, η2p = 0.008] or stress × frame × threat
potentiated (threat minus safe) anxiety rating interaction
[F(1,80) = 0.40, p = 0.53, η2p = 0.005].
Reaction times
Neither safe–threat order [stress × frame × order interaction:
F(1,73) = 0.20, p = 0.65, η2p = 0.003] nor baseline symptoms
[stress × frame × STAI interaction: F(1,73) = 0.11, p = 0.74,
η2p = 0.001; stress × frame × BDI interaction: F(1,72) = 1.3,





Temporal discounting was demonstrated by a signiﬁcant main
eﬀect of delay on indiﬀerence points [F(2,70) = 79, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.7]. This varied depending upon whether subjects
were asked about wins or losses [time × valence interaction:
F(2,70) = 8, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.2] but did not diﬀer across
the diﬀerent values [time × value interaction: F(4,140) = 1.3,
p= 0.26, η2p = 0.04]. Critically, this also did not diﬀer under stress
[time × stress interaction: F(2,70) = 0.24, p = 0.79, η2p = 0.007,
Figure 3A; main eﬀect of stress: F(1,35) = 0.8, p = 0.37,
η2p = 0.02; time × valence × stress: F(2,70) = 0.16, p = 0.86,
η2p = 0.004; time × valence × value × stress: F(4,140) = 0.73,
p = 0.58, η2p = 0.02]. Bayes factor analysis revealed a
winning indiﬀerence point model comprising a time by valence
interaction (logBF10 = 294) that was decisively (>150 times)
better than model additionally including a stress by time
interaction (logBF10 = 264), a stress by valence by time model
(logBF10 = 271) or a time alone model (logBF10 = 271).
Reaction times
There was a main eﬀect of time on RTs [F(2,70) = 9.9,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.22], a main eﬀect of valence [F(1,35) = 9.6,
p= 0.004, η2p = 0.22] and a signiﬁcant valence× time interaction
[F(2,70)= 7.9, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.18]. Simple main eﬀects analyses
revealed that this interaction was driven by a main eﬀect of time
in the gain domain [subjects became progressively slower with
increasing time: F(2,34) = 15, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.47] but not
the loss domain [subjects were always as slow as the slowest
(i.e., 25 years) time point in the gains domain: F(2,34) = 1.8,
p = 0.19, η2p = 0.09]. There was no main eﬀect of stress
[F(1,35) = 2.6, p = 0.12, η2p = 0.07] or stress by time interaction
[F(2,70) = 0.8, p = 0.4, η2p = 0.02]. There was a trend toward a
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FIGURE 3 | Stress has (A) no behavioral effect on temporal
discounting, but does (B) induce relative decision-speeding under
threat in individuals with higher depressive symptoms. Error bars
indicate SEM; ∗p < 0.01.
stress × valence interaction [F(1,35) = 4.1, p = 0.050, η2p = 0.11]
but Bayes factor analysis revealed this model (logBF10 = 9) to be
decisively (>150 times) worse than the winning valence × time
model (logBF10 = 23).
(B) Between-Subject Effects
Choice behavior
No eﬀects of interest interacted with task order [for indiﬀerence
points, time × order interaction: F(2,68) = 1.1, p = 0.34,
η2p = 0.03] or baseline symptoms (for indiﬀerence points
time × STAI interaction: F(2,68) = 0.51, p = 0.6, η2p = 0.02;
time × BDI interaction: F(2,68) = 0.27, p = 0.8, η2p = 0.008].
There was no exploratory time × stress × gender interaction
[F(2,68) = 0.26, p = 0.8, η2p = 0.007], time × stress × age
interaction [F(2,68) = 0.13, p = 0.88, η2p = 0.004] or
time × stress × threat potentiated (threat minus safe) anxiety
rating interaction [F(2,66) = 1.4, p = 0.30, η2p = 0.039]).
Reaction times
There was no time × order interaction [F(2,68) = 0.94,
p = 0.4, η2p = 0.03] or time × valence × order interaction
[F(2,68) = 0.043, p = 0.96, η2p = 0.001], but there was a
signiﬁcant stress × order interaction [F(1,34) = 16, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.32] driven by those who experienced the safe condition
ﬁrst responding signiﬁcantly faster under threat [F(1,34) = 17,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.33; no diﬀerence between conditions in those
who received threat ﬁrst: F(1,34) = 2.5, p = 0.12, η2p = 0.07].
There was no interaction between trait anxiety and any of the
eﬀects of interest (all p > 0.1), but there was a signiﬁcant
interaction between stress and BDI scores [F(1,34) = 9.1,
p = 0.005, η2p = 0.21] driven by a negative correlation [r(35) = –
0.5] between the diﬀerence between threat and safe RTs and BDI
(correlation substantially better model than null: logBF10 = 2.3;
Figure 3B). In other words, the more depression symptoms
an individual reported, the faster they responded under threat
relative to safe conditions.
Discussion
In this study, we were able to replicate two well-established biases
in decision-making: the framing eﬀect and temporal discounting.
Moreover, we demonstrated a clear impact of threat of shock on
subjective mood and choice reaction times. However, contrary
to our predictions, stress did not alter the observed decision-
making biases, perhaps because these executive decision-making
biases are traits that are impervious to, or are able to override,
the lower-level state aﬀective biases induced by stress (Robinson
et al., 2013c).
We ﬁrst replicated the well-established framing eﬀect, in
which there is a bias toward risky behavior in the losses domain,
and toward risk-aversion in the gains domain (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). However, this bias was not altered by threat of
shock in this study. To the best of our knowledge there is no
previous literature exploring the impact of threat of shock on this
eﬀect, but there are a number of studies exploring the impact
of diﬀerent manipulations on framing. Using the cold pressor
task Porcelli and Delgado (2009) found that the framing eﬀect
was enhanced by stress relative to a non-stress control condition.
Given our sample size (N = 81), we had 99.1% statistical power
(with alpha = 0.05; two-tailed) to replicate this interaction
(with eﬀect size |d| = 0.487; Porcelli and Delgado, 2009). One
possible explanation for the discrepancy is simply that they used
a diﬀerent manipulation; very little, if any, work has directly
compared threat of shock and cold pressor on stress responses
(Robinson et al., 2013c). One key diﬀerence between paradigms,
however, is that the cold pressor is generally completed prior to
the task, since it requires the individual to submerge their hand
in cold water. As such, it is plausible that it explores the impact
of recovery from stress (Robinson et al., 2013c) rather than a
current stressful context (which is a key advantage of the threat
of shock technique used here). Another possibility highlighted by
the authors is that their eﬀect was a learning eﬀect since the stress
block always followed the no-stress block (Porcelli and Delgado,
2009).
Two further studies have explored the eﬀects of another stress
manipulation – the Trier social stressor test – on framing. Pabst
et al found the opposite pattern to Porcelli and Delgado (2009);
a reduced framing eﬀect under stress (Pabst et al., 2013) albeit
only in a subsample of their participants. Buckert et al. (2014)
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also showed reduced framing under social stress on a game of dice
task. This discrepancy across manipulations could be attributed
to the speciﬁc type of stress; whilst the cold pressor is physically
painful, the Trier task asks subjects to ready themselves for
unprepared public speaking which is a social form of stress. It
is possible that the speciﬁc domain of anxiety inﬂuences the
outcome; e.g., social rewardsmight be particularly inﬂuenced by a
social anxiety induction. Nevertheless, adding our null eﬀect with
a further stressor to these inconsistent eﬀects of stress leaves the
role of stress on framing unclear (Table 1). This lack of clarity also
highlights the need for work directly comparing diﬀerent stress
manipulations across the same tasks.
In our second experiment we replicated the temporal
discounting eﬀect. Speciﬁcally, participants assigned less utility
to outcomes in the future. Again, however, we failed to detect
an impact of stress on this bias. Temporal discounting has not
been assessed under threat of shock to our knowledge, but
this null ﬁnding is consistent with at least three prior studies
(Lempert et al., 2012; Haushofer et al., 2013; Jenks and Lawyer,
2015) utilizing the Trier social stressor test. In all three studies
stress increased both subjective and/or hormonal indicators of
stress, but had no eﬀect on discounting (Table 1). Where anxiety
has been associated with temporal discounting it is in studies
exploring between-subject individual diﬀerences in social anxiety
(Rounds et al., 2007) or clinically deﬁned depression (Pulcu et al.,
2014). In both cases this is consistent with temporal discounting
being a stable, trait measure (Odum, 2011). Temporary or acute
mood ﬂuctuations such as stress or anxiety may be therefore
be unable to inﬂuence such traits. That said, it should be noted
that we fail to see an interaction with trait depression or anxiety
symptoms in our sample and the Rounds eﬀect cited above
recently failed to replicate (Jenks and Lawyer, 2015) so ﬁrm
conclusions are perhaps unwarranted.
We do, however, see some evidence of stress impacting
reaction time across both tasks. This is critical because it
suggests that the threat of shock manipulation was eﬀective
at instantiating behavioral change. In other words, in addition
to the subjective reports of anxiety, subjects’ responses were
impacted by threat, even though these did not carry over into
their decisions. Reaction time eﬀects in the absence of decision
eﬀects are consistent with prior work (Murphy, 1959; Keinan,
1987; Engelmann et al., 2015) and perhaps reﬂect a bias toward
making some decisions faster under conditions of stress. From an
evolutionary perspective, such a mechanism could be adaptive: a
faster decision about which direction to go when running away
from a predator, for instance, may improve survival chances. It
should be noted, moreover, that the reaction time correlation
with depression symptoms we see in the temporal discounting
TABLE 1 | Review of findings cited in this paper (=, null effect; N/A, not
cited; ↑, increased effect; ↓, reduced effect).
Framing Temporal discounting
Cold pressor ↑ N/A
Social stress ↓ =
Threat of shock = =
reaction time eﬀect, somewhat mimics our previously reported
eﬀect in the Iowa Gambling Task (Robinson et al., 2015).
In that study, we saw increased selection of disadvantageous
decks under threat relative to safe in individuals with high
anxiety or depression symptomatology (Robinson et al., 2015).
Here we observed (in a partially overlapping sample) quicker
responses under threat relative to safe conditions in those who
reported greater depressive symptoms. It is plausible that these
eﬀects may represent some form of underlying vulnerability in
individuals with subclinical depressive symptoms. Having said
that, the eﬀect in the present task was not also observed in an
relationship with trait anxiety scores (unlike our prior report),
which is surprising because trait anxiety and BDI scores are
highly correlated in most samples (including this one: R = 0.8,
p < 0.001). Whilst it is possible that the present eﬀect is speciﬁc
to depression vs. anxiety symptoms we feel that this conclusion
would be unwarranted based on the current data, and it requires
replication in a larger sample. Reaction time eﬀects can, however,
have multiple underlying causes; the eﬀects could be driven by
altered decision-making processes, but could also be driven by
the time it takes to encode or instantiate a reaction toward a
stimulus (Ratcliﬀ and McKoon, 2008) and it is not possible to
fully distinguish between these possibilities. Recent work has
in fact highlighted the need for researchers to be extremely
cautious when using reverse-inference to infer cognitive states
from reaction time (Krajbich et al., 2015). Indeed, in general,
the exact nature of the reaction time eﬀects seen here were
not predicted a priori, and in one instance the Bayesian and
frequentist tests are partially discrepant (within-subject temporal
discounting p= 0.050 vs. 150 times worse) and as such we do not
wish to draw ﬁrm conclusions beyond observing that the eﬀects
indicate that the manipulation was having some eﬀect during the
tasks.
This raises the question as to why is there are clear aﬀective
biases under threat of shock (Robinson et al., 2013c), but that
these biases do not impact decisions. One speculation is that this
is because such ‘bottom–up’ biases do not inﬂuence some higher
level, executive processes. Or, if the biases are processed later in
the hierarchy, it may be that the executive overrides lower level
biases. Evolutionarily, an ability of executive function to ignore or
override lower level fear and stress responses might be adaptive in
certain circumstances. Alternatively, these biasesmight reﬂect the
use of highly eﬃcient heuristics/rules of thumb which are robust
to the eﬀects of stress on aﬀective processing. Lower level aﬀective
biases may therefore constitute state eﬀects of mood disorders
that change with symptoms, whilst the executive decision-
making biases constitute stable traits. Such traits may contribute
to stress-related disorder susceptibility (Pulcu et al., 2014), but
not change with mood symptoms. Understanding the distinction
between diﬀerent levels of cognitive function that are impacted
by stress might plausibly inform our treatments for stress-related
disorders. Speciﬁcally, the focus might be on shifting lower-level
state aﬀective biases rather than trait executive biases. Either way,
in contrast to our hypotheses the present study provides evidence
for the proposition that certain higher order executive decision-
making functions are impervious to stress induced by threat of
shock.
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Limitations
It should be noted that one explanation for our lack of eﬀect
is that our stress manipulation was not strong enough to elicit
change. Perhaps under conditions of extreme threat (e.g., a
warzone or high-stakes work environment) decision-making of
this type can be shifted by threat. Alternatively given higher
time pressure, higher ﬁnancial gambles, or explicit feedback
about the outcomes of gambles, individual’s decisions would
have been shifted by threat of shock. Moreover, as discussed
above, there are many diﬀerent ‘stress’ manipulations across
social, pain, and other domains and it is unclear exactly how
these overlap. The extent to which this non-signiﬁcant eﬀect
of stress generalizes across stress manipulations is unclear.
In addition, these ﬁndings do not rule out the impact of
threat of shock on other types of decision-making such as
those that involves working memory or inhibitory control
[both of which have in fact been shown to be inﬂuenced by
threat (Robinson et al., 2013a,c)]. Overall, a non-signiﬁcant
eﬀect of this nature is diﬃcult to prove as it may simply
be that we have failed to ﬁnd the correct context in which
stress impairs the executive functions explored here. A further
limitation is that these individuals were not screened using
a diagnostic interview. As such, some individuals may have
previous diagnoses which they had forgotten, or may have been
missed by using a checklist screening instrument. Finally, these
ﬁndings do not of course rule out the possibility that positive
mood might have eﬀects on these sorts of decision making tasks.
Indeed there is preliminary (albeit complex) data suggesting that
positive mood can inﬂuence temporal discounting (Hirsh et al.,
2010) and Iowa Gambling Task performance (De Vries et al.,
2008).
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